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Summary
Together with a move from a rules-based legal approach to a more economic approach in
competition cases, the economic effects of competition law enforcement have received increas-
ing attention. Measuring these effects is important for external accountability of the Competition
Authority, for quality control of its decisions and for evaluating the effectiveness of the compe-
tition law. This raises many issues in measurement, including the choice of counterfactual, the
choice of effects to be measured, and the proper use of available data. The papers in this Special
Issue of De Economist discuss these and related issues, based on a broad range of experience in
competition law enforcement.
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1 BACKGROUND
The origin of modern competition policy goes back to the 19th century
in the US. It was a response to the emergence of large companies which
tried to restrict effective competition, partly by price fixing agreements in
order to prevent price wars. This behaviour was at the expense of con-
sumers. In 1890, the Sherman Act was passed. Initially, enforcement of
this antitrust act was not very strict and it did not include merger con-
trol. Consequently, companies wishing to coordinate prices decided to merge.
In response to this behaviour, the Clayton Act of 1914 included the pro-
hibition of mergers that could substantially reduce competition. After sev-
eral waves of strict and less strict enforcement, in the 1970s there was
more criticism on the relatively interventionist enforcement practices and
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more emphasis was put on an efficiency rationale behind vertical coordina-
tion and mergers. This introduced more of an economic perspective in the
evaluations1.
In Europe, Germany in particular has a long history in competition law.
Here, the prevailing view was that cartels were an instrument to control the
instability created by competition and price wars. In 1923, the Cartel Law was
introduced. Under this law, cartels were allowed provided that they were reg-
istered and that they would not abuse their market power. In 1957, a more
strict competition law was passed which focused on the prevention of price
fixing and other anti-competitive behaviour. In 1973 merger control was also
introduced.
At EU level, the start of competition law can be traced back to the Treaty
of Paris (1951) and more formally to the Treaty of Rome (1957). In the Treaty
of Paris, there are rules to prevent trade barriers and discriminatory practices
which might distort competition among the six member states. There is a ban
on agreements and concerted practices between companies which tend to pre-
vent, restrict or distort effective competition. These underlying ideas can also
be seen in the Treaty of Rome and later adjustments. Merger control was not
included in the Treaty of Rome but was introduced by the Merger Regula-
tion of 1989. From the start, the primary goal of European regulation was
the elimination of any discrimination on the grounds of nationality between
the member states. Competition law was a means to promote economic pro-
gress and welfare for European citizens.
The Netherlands competition law dates from 1998 and is based on the
European competition law. The law of 1998 substituted the law of 1956, the
Wet Economische Mededinging, which allowed cartel agreements as long as
they were reported to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, following the Ger-
man tradition.
Also in other European countries, the European competition law now
forms the basis of their national competition laws.
The enforcement of competition law can take different forms. Particularly
in the first decades, a clear ‘per se rules’ approach was followed based on
simple rules of thumb, leaving little scope for the enforcement authorities to
depart from specified thresholds. Lawyers played a central role in the deci-
sion making process on competition cases. Both in the US and the EU, how-
ever, there is a trend towards a ‘rule of reason’ approach (Christiansen and
Kerber 2006). In Europe, a trend to base competition policy on a ‘more eco-
nomic’ approach comes to the fore in the improved economic analysis in the
assessment of specific competition cases (for an overview, see Neven 2006).
This more economic approach has been justified by new insights from eco-
nomic literature on the potential (positive as well as negative) welfare effects
1 For a more extensive overview, see Motta (2004).
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of certain business practices. Especially in merger control, increasing atten-
tion is given to economic arguments and models. Economic insights also
prove important for evaluating proposed remedies. In article 82 on the abuse
of dominant positions, the interpretation is still rather formalistic. There is,
however, a development towards a more effect-based approach (Neven 2006:
746).
2 ECONOMIC EFFECTS
Together with this more economic approach in competition cases, attention
for the economic effects of enforcement activities by the competition author-
ities is also growing. During the past decade, several national competition
authorities have proposed methodologies for measuring the economic effects.
There are at least three reasons for conducting such studies:
• the external accountability of the competition authority;
• quality control of the decisions; and
• evaluation of the effectiveness of the competition law.
Accountability is particularly requested by politics. For instance in the US,
the Government Performance and Result Act of 1993 is one of the rea-
sons why the US Department of Justice (US DoJ) and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) have been calculating the impact of their enforcement
activities ever since 1999 (see Nelson and Sun 2001). Also in the UK, mea-
surement of the impact of enforcement activities is important as consumer
savings is one of the targets to be met by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT).
Under the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review settlement, the OFT agreed
to the target that the direct financial benefits to consumers are at least
five times that of OFT’s cost to taxpayers. The Netherlands Competition
Authority has been publishing consumer savings in its annual reports since
2004.
Ex post evaluation for quality control focuses on the internal learning pro-
cesses of the authority. Evaluation studies can help competition authorities
detect past errors and understand the reasons which led to those errors. Court
rulings also provide a type of ex post evaluation for some decisions of the
competition authority.
Finally, the issue of effectiveness refers to the overall design of the compe-
tition policy regime and its enforcement. Several benchmarks have been devel-
oped to evaluate and compare different competition regimes. For instance, the
OECD has carried out several peer reviews for different countries and the
Global Competition Review publishes annual ratings of the different compe-
tition authorities.
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2.1 Measurement
This Special Issue brings together several papers discussing the measure-
ment of the economic effects of competition law enforcement.2 A quantitative
assessment of these effects can serve a broader purpose than just the evalua-
tion of competition law enforcement. For instance, it may also influence the
choice of priorities in fighting anti-competitive practices or establish the size
of damages to be paid in compensation for concrete anti-competitive prac-
tices. Gunnar Niels and Reinder van Dijk show how the choice of the coun-
terfactual depends on the purpose of the exercise. By and large, the list of
costs and benefits to be assessed is fixed, but some categories will prove more
important than others in any particular type of exercise. The economic ben-
efits should include productive and allocative efficiency, enhanced dynamic
competition and innovation, enhanced market functioning and macro-eco-
nomic effects. Like other authors in this Special Issue, they note that assess-
ments of economic effects often assume that the decisions of the competition
authority have all been correct. However, a proper evaluation should allow
for type I and type II errors.
2.2 Evaluation Criteria
There appears to be some controversy regarding the proper concept for mea-
suring costs and benefits: consumer welfare or social welfare? Is the net ben-
efit of breaking a monopoly equal to the consumer savings obtained because
the competitive price is below the monopoly price, or should we subtract the
loss of monopoly profits to the producer, leaving only the Harberger triangle,
i.e. the social welfare gain that results from the elimination of the deadweight
loss? Some authors claim that economists should promote targeting social
welfare. They appear to ignore the more basic issue that any aggregate wel-
fare measure must attach weights to changes in the welfare of different peo-
ple, which implies a normative (and hence political) position right from the
start. On the other hand, Niels and Van Dijk warn against focusing solely on
consumer welfare, because they think economic efficiency should come first in
assessing competition policy. They propose including all costs and benefits to
all the various participants in the calculations, monetising them as far as pos-
sible to make them comparable. If considered appropriate, different weights
can then be given to different groups. Jarig van Sinderen and Ron Kemp pro-
vide a further discussion, recalling the idea that focusing on consumer welfare
2 The papers draw on contributions that were originally prepared for a workshop on
Measuring the Economic Effects of Competition Law Enforcement, held in October 2007 at
the Netherlands Competition Authority. The editors gratefully acknowledge the support of the
Netherlands Competition Authority in producing this Special Issue.
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may be a suitable tactic in maximising social welfare, a point which is also
stressed by Pierluigi Sabbatini.
Many authorities have the explicit target to enhance consumer welfare. The
EU Directorate-General for Competition states as its mission “to enforce the
competition rules of the Community Treaties, in order to ensure that competi-
tion in the EU market is not distorted and that markets operate as efficiently
as possible, thereby contributing to the welfare of consumers and to the com-
petitiveness of the European economy”.3 Competitiveness suggests productive
efficiency, but surely does not include all monopoly profits.
Van Sinderen and Kemp review studies of the macro-economic effects of
competition policy. They argue that, besides the calculation of consumer sav-
ings or welfare effects, information on more macro-economic variables such
as economic growth, employment and productivity are also important, espe-
cially for the political debate on competition and deregulation. Several model
calculations and sector studies from the literature suggest positive effects on
GDP, employment and in most cases also on productivity. To these stud-
ies, they add their own estimates for the Netherlands, obtained with a new
method. They use a conventional estimate of consumer savings and show
how it can be interpreted as a cut in the “market power wedge”, which is
comparable to a cut in the tax wedge. This then allows a simulation with a
macroeconomic model to assess the macroeconomic effects of increased com-
petition. It shows that GDP, consumption, investments and employment have
all grown in response to the enforcement of the Competition Law of 1998.
2.3 Measuring Welfare Gains Obtained by the Competition Authority
Several authors note that the estimated direct gains to consumers from anti-
trust policies alone tend to be well in excess of the budget costs of the Com-
petition Authority enforcing them. Indirect gains, such as those obtained from
deterring other cartel behaviour and net gains from merger control will add
to the benefits of the Authority. Mats Bergman warns that benefits from car-
tel enforcement may often be exaggerated relative to those of merger con-
trol. Of course, the Authority may also generate losses, in particular from
type I errors in abuse of dominant position or merger decisions and the ensu-
ing deterrence of pro-competitive behaviour. Yet, as is also noted by Damien
Neven and Hans Zenger, there is little doubt that at aggregate level, Compe-
tition Authorities do deliver substantial net welfare gains to consumers.
This leaves open the possibility that the Authority could have done better.
The effectiveness of competition enforcement is the main subject of Bergman’s
paper. He distinguishes between qualitative and quantitative evaluations,
where the latter are defined to be only those that include a quantitative
3 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/mission/.
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estimate of consumer savings. Prominent among qualitative evaluations are
court appeals, which provide an in-depth evaluation of decisions on individ-
ual cases. Peer reviews and customer satisfaction surveys are also useful for
assessing whether the Authority is on par with international best practice.
Quantitative evaluations clearly serve a purpose in communicating the value
of the competition law and the welfare gains obtained from intervention by
the Competition Authority. According to Bergman, there is no strong case for
a specialised external auditor to assess the authority’s performance and the
overall impact of its activity. Many of its decisions are already assessed in
court and any attempt to measure the aggregate social benefits is likely to be
very costly and still bound to fail in accurately estimating the effects of deter-
rence, arguably the most important effect of competition law enforcement.
Fiammetta Gordon and David Squires discuss the studies that have shed
light on the effects of deterrence. Most studies estimate these effects from a
survey under selected lawyers. The available evidence confirms that the deter-
rent effect is more important than the direct effect of a competition author-
ity’s work. In a recent study for the UK, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT)
estimated consumer savings from deterrence at some £580million per year,
3.7 times the direct effects. From the underlying Deloitte survey, Gordon and
Squires also draw some suggestions for improving competition policy. They
discuss compulsory versus voluntary notification of mergers, procedures for
negotiating merger remedies, the type and level of sanctions and the risk of
deterring neutral or pro-competitive conduct.
In his critical review of empirical evidence on the effects of antitrust
enforcement in the US, Gregory Werden focuses on cartel and merger cases.
He explains why an objective assessment based on hard evidence is not pos-
sible for deterrence effects or for the effects of enforcement against single-
competitor exclusionary conduct. For cartels, the available evidence suggests
that price effects are substantial—at least 10% on average. For lack of data,
in particular on the counterfactual, the effects of blocking mergers are more
difficult to assess and often rely on a calibrated simulation model. In esti-
mating consumer savings from merger control, the US Department of Justice
ignores non-price effects and assumes a price elasticity of demand between
−1 and −1.5. Enforcement against horizontal mergers may well produce sav-
ings comparable to those of cartel enforcement, although views are divided
as to whether those savings could be enhanced by tightening or loosening
enforcement standards.
2.4 Evaluating Decisions of the Competition Authority
Many empirical studies have focused on assessing the costs and benefits of
decisions made in concrete cases by a Competition Authority. The main prob-
lems faced in such case studies are the choice of a proper counterfactual and
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the method to estimate the concomitant evolution of economic variables, so
that the difference between it and the actual evolution can be considered the
economic effects of the decision. In the context of EU merger control deci-
sions, Paolo Buccirossi et al. discuss both the relevant counterfactuals and, for
the various cases, the types of empirical techniques that can be used under
different circumstances. All four types of techniques (surveys, event studies,
structural modelling and non-experimental policy evaluation) have their pros
and cons and each has its own special data requirements.
Taking a principal-agent perspective, Damien Neven and Hans Zenger stress
that designing an ex post evaluation scheme to assess an agency’s success
will have an immediate impact on the way the agency operates. In particu-
lar when results of the evaluation are used to allocate resources, internally
or externally, imprecise measurements of performance may bring about detri-
mental behavioural responses in an attempt to produce satisfying evaluation
results. For example, as long as deterrence effects are not properly taken into
account, there is a risk of over-enforcement to the detriment of social wel-
fare. To evaluate the agency’s efficiency, average rather than marginal costs
and benefits should be used. An efficient agency should reduce its probabil-
ity of making erroneous decisions only to the extent that the expected gain of
reducing it further outweighs the costs. The acceptable level of errors is also
affected by the standard of proof laid down by courts and the legal system.
Neven and Zenger identify some further pitfalls in competition policy eval-
uation, including the risk of overlooking merger-specific efficiencies and the
methodological limitations of event studies.
Pierluigi Sabbatini offers a fascinating insight into some practical experi-
ences of the Italian Competition Authority. With the benefit of hindsight, he
discusses two cases and shows how the behaviour of companies and consum-
ers may hold surprises for the authority. From both cases he draws some les-
sons for competition authorities. In particular, disclosure of information on
anticompetitive behaviour to the general public can make the market more
transparent and yield better prospects for entrants. In assessing a merger, the
authority should not only study the effects on local relevant markets, but also
include possible changes in the incentive structure at a higher level. When
divestures are imposed, the appointment of an independent trustee may be
required to prevent the depletion of assets.
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